Ten Iranian Questions

 

1. What are we to make of Saturday night’s destruction of the three Iranian nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan?

Trump and the U.S. military took a great risk and succeeded in astounding fashion. Operationally, the destruction of the nuclear sites seems to have gone perfectly, in contrast to a long history of America’s Middle East debacles from the failed 1980 Carter rescue mission to the 2021 flight from Kabul.

The long-overdue message to Iran is that there are finally consequences for a half-century effort of killing Americans, promising death to the U.S. and Israel, and attempting to murder a U.S. president.

It’s also surreal to see leftist critics now say that Trump deviated from past presidents’ heroic, peaceful efforts to negotiate an end to the Iranian nuclear threat, when suddenly, after assuming office, Trump was apprised that Iran was weeks away from getting a bomb.

So, how did that happen after all those heroic diplomatic efforts? Why was the Iranian bomb program not ended during the Biden administration’s last four years? And who but Barack Obama opened the floodgates of Iranian revenue to fund these monstrous programs?

How strange the legal criticisms of the left are. In 2011, repeatedly bombing and killing hundreds of Libyan civilians and setting off a decade of chaos and mayhem were constitutionally okay, but a one-mission taking out a rogue nation’s nuclear facilities that threatened world peace and likely killed few, if any, civilians was unconstitutional and amoral?

Note well: Obama bombed, with B-2s no less, Libya again on his last full day in office in 2017—to finish off his disastrous five-year-long Susan Rice/Samantha Power/Hillary Clinton (“We came, we saw, he died”)/Ben Rhodes-directed destruction of Libya.

In the end, critics on the left and right are flummoxed and left sputtering only, “Iran cannot get a nuclear weapon”—even as every prior president had failed to slow Iran’s progression to a bomb—until Trump alone just did.

Intelligence-wise, it was quite stunning how there were no leaks but lots of successful misdirection and deceptions, such as redeploying the B-2s to Guam. It also made sense to strike early in Trump’s two-week window of warning, as otherwise, each day of quiet worked against the element of surprise.

It was not exactly rah-rah, Yanqui recklessness, but rather almost inevitable. Trump had warned the Iranians on numerous occasions. They never got the message. They were apparently listening to the American Left’s smears of Trump as a “TACO” (“Trump Always Chickens Out”)—a silly slur phrase that just died Saturday night.

The decision thus became whether the world wanted another North Korea in the Middle East or not. Even our enemies probably did not.

Trump has now given Iran the chance of a one-off attack and a return to negotiations—but over what, given that Iran now has nothing to negotiate with other than the survival of its regime?

Again, the fact that the operation was so complex and went apparently according to plan will impress allies and warn enemies—and make Iran worry that more of the same could come and be as effective.

2. But what happens now? Won’t Iran release its terrorist cells in the U.S., or attack U.S. bases nearby with missiles and drones, or unleash missiles at the Gulf oil fields, or mine the Straits of Hormuz, or unleash a new unforeseen volley of missiles at Israel?

Those scenarios are endless.

But this mission was not a 1991 or 2003 bombing as a preliminary to a ground invasion. Nor was it a pile-on 2011 Libyan bombing campaign designed for regime change. It had a limited agenda—the destruction of Iran’s nuclear fortresses—and it apparently succeeded. Iran would be wise to seek a ceasefire and negotiate for the regime’s survival. Pundits claim Iran must do something to restore its reputation. But the more it acts and fails, the greater its humiliation.

U.S. naval power will soon stop any Iranian naval attacks in the Straits of Hormuz. If Iran sends missiles into the Gulf oil fields, it will lose their own.

If they hit American bases, they will likely get a response quite unlike the aftermath lull of the killing of Gen. Soleimani. If they have a hidden massive missile arsenal to unleash on Israel, Israel will respond in kind.

What is unprecedented about the current tension is that the supposed powerhouse of the Middle East now has no defenses, no nuclear deterrent, and few terrorist operatives left in Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, or Yemen. If they conduct terrorism in the United States, we would likely see mass deportations of thousands of Iranian green card or travel visa holders, and standoff missile and bombing retaliations against Iran.

Otherwise, Israel will continue to strike Iran, and the U.S. will likely pivot and offer to negotiate an end—unless it is attacked.

All wars end one way or another, usually when one side sees no chance of success. Iran may continue a Houthi-style missile exchange, but like them, it will eventually either sue for a truce or dissolve.

3. What will be the reaction of the Iranian street or the military?

Again, who knows?

Will the humiliation from the bombing force regime change? And would what follows be better, the same, or worse?

Theocracy is a much more dangerous government, given Iran’s size, wealth, and nuclear expertise, than those nations run by past bombed-out dictators like Gaddafi, Milosevic, the Taliban, and Saddam Hussein. And even their fates offer mixed messages as to what followed their forced demise. One could argue that what succeeded the jailed Milosevic was clearly better; the executed Saddam, eventually, maybe better; the murdered Gaddafi, likely no better and probably worse; and the Taliban simply returned to power, energized with $50 billion in U.S. munitions, vehicles, and military infrastructure.

The innate idea of bombing a nation with virtual impunity from the air, however justified, selective, or careful, often does not go down well with those on the receiving end.

But that said, the generals now know their superiors are being killed off by the Israelis, and would not wish to be next on the list. And they fear the military has just been further humiliated in the eyes of the public and revealed its impotence by losing this war.

The generals surely appreciate that the people not just resent perhaps $1 trillion over nearly fifty years invested in the greedy and now neutered Hamas, Hezbollah, the Assads, and the Houthis, as well as the vast subterranean nuclear facilities, and billions of dollars spent on missiles and air defense—but that it was all for nothing.

Those costs are aside from perhaps another $1 trillion lost needlessly over nearly half a century to sanctions and embargoes due to its ill-fated nuclear agenda and terrorism. Waste is one thing; waste and humiliation are another.

4. What was Trump doing by announcing a 1-14 day window to decide the use of force?

The value of talking about negotiations was fourfold:

a) to show the world Trump was not a trigger-happy interventionist, so if he did strike, he did so reluctantly, given the refusal of the mullahcracy to peacefully swear off enriching uranium;

b) to allow time for a final window for U.S. naval and air assets to assemble in the Gulf region or within striking distance of it;

c) to deceive Iran and the world into thinking he would attack in two weeks rather than two days, and to remind the world that his warnings are backed by consequences;

d) to see by chance if Israel could have solved the problem first—i.e., if it has any big surprises ranging from commando raids on nuclear facilities to the use of large cargo planes adapted to bunker-buster use. In the end, it apparently did not.

5. What is the attitude of the Arab Islamic world—specifically the proximate Gulf states, Egypt, and Jordan—to the American elimination of the Iranian nuclear program?

Prior to the attack, the mindset of the so-called moderate Arab nations was predictable:

a) private communications to Iran’s Supreme Leader that they stand in solidarity with a fellow Islamic nation unduly attacked by the “Zionists”—something they claim they had nothing to do with and, of course, abhor;

b) mostly public silence, interspliced with sporadic calls for “negotiations,” “calm,” and “restraint,” punctuated with boilerplate criticism of Israel for its “preemption” and “aggression.”

c) frantic stealth communications with Trump and CentCom—and perhaps even Netanyahu—along the lines of something like, “If you all insist on doing this, please assure us that you don’t quit and leave a surviving Iran angry at our double-dealing. Guarantee to us that you will intervene and neuter or remove any vestiges of this rogue Iranian regime. Do not let this wounded animal lick its wounds and reemerge for revenge.”

And now postmortem?

d) The Arab world will be relieved, largely keep quiet other than a few protestations, but also insist that the U.S. protect the Gulf states from Iranian retaliation, and hope the U.S. can forge some sort of truce—but only if Iran is truly defanged.

6. After the attack, will the MAGA base splinter Trump’s support and help weaken his agenda before the midterms?

Not really.

Even Trump’s fiercest Iran critics, like Marjorie Taylor Greene and Steven Bannon, or milder ones, like Rand Paul, know that they agree with 80 percent of his MAGA agenda. Tucker Carlson said if Iran tried to kill Trump (they did and the Biden DOJ filed charges), he would advocate a (nuclear) bombing campaign against it.

Conservative critics understand that their opposition to a Trump intervention does not poll well with either MAGA or Republicans at large, but very well with the Squad and Bernie Sanders’ new Democrat Party.

So, there will be no third-party movement. No one leaves a movement when it agrees with the vast majority of its efforts and there is no viable alternative.

Realistically, critiques of Trump’s intervention always hinged on its success or failure. So far, the military operation seems a success. It is hard to envision methods by which Iran could sustain a war against enemies who have no desire to set one foot on its ground.

Often, success or failure arbitrates the level of criticism. For example, by late April 2003, sharp but opportunistic critics of Bush’s invasion of Iraq suddenly pivoted—as Saddam’s statue fell, with only light American casualties—to brag that they were neocon nation builders (e.g., MSNBC’s Chris Matthews: “We are all neocons now!”).

But by 2004, with the killings and insurgencies gaining ground, even Bush’s “Project for a New American Century” supporters now defected and whined that “our brilliant invasion was wrecked by your incompetent occupation.”

Human nature being what it is, most react predictably to success or failure. (Football teams 10-0 are sold out; those 2-8 can’t give away tickets.). So let us see how the current success ages in the next few months.

7. Will Russia or China put pressure on the U.S. to restrain Israel, intervene, or cause havoc?

No.

Russia? It is bleeding in Ukraine. It will privately not be unhappy that Iran will, for now, remain non-nuclear, but very happy any commotion in the Gulf could spike world oil prices and help Russia survive the embargo and refuel its aggression against Ukraine.

Trump will pay lip service to Putin so that he does not appear completely impotent after his forced departure from the Middle East.

And Putin will likely return to his 2017-21 appraisal that Trump is too volatile and unpredictable to gamble against.

China? It wants no upheaval anywhere near 50 percent of its imported oil. The idea that the U.S. could be distracted in the Middle East is seen by Beijing as desirable. Seeing Trump act quite successfully to take out a nuclear facility halfway across the world will likely sober President Xi.

8. How will Trump fare in the war?

Well, Iran, after all, likely tried to kill Trump and still brags about how it will destroy Israel and attack the U.S.—the same old boilerplate of the last half-century. Had the attack gone the way of past failed American efforts, Trump would have been in dire political trouble. But it did not, and so he will reap the advantages that accrue from success to a president.

Trump’s unpredictability so far has confused his enemies more than his allies. (Iran is probably flummoxed that no American president has ever bombed it, while post facto, no American president would ever be willing to talk to it during a war that it is losing.)

9. Will the image and profile of Israel in the Middle East change after the war?

It did after the euphoria of the brilliant 1967 Six-Day War victory, just as it slumped after being surprised by the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and the October 7 massacres.

But as of now, the very idea, say, in October 2023, that 21 months later Israel would have destroyed Hamas; damaged the Houthis; dismantled the supposedly indestructible Hezbollah; helped create the momentum to collapse the entire Assad dynasty in Syria; seen Russia mostly ostracized and absent from the Middle East; destroyed utterly Iran’s air defenses; and been flying at will, systematically blowing up Iranian command and control personnel, its nuclear architecture, and its once dreaded missile fleet—would have been considered so unlikely as to be sheer fantasy. And that is well aside from the U.S. destroying what was left of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.

So, yes, Israel will likely emerge from this two-year nightmare with a much higher deterrent profile and respect.

Its chief danger will be hubris. Overconfidence led to the surprises of 1973. And hubris also led to 2023, 50 years later, to the very hour after being similarly shocked. Israel will likely be wary of its unprecedented success.

10. How did Iran lose its Shia crescent and its terrorist surrogates?

In truth, Iran was likely the most hated nation in the world. The Arab world despised it. Europe and the U.S. loathed it. Its bullying terrorism turned off even illiberal regimes. Anti-Islamic China and Russia found it useful, but otherwise, did not boast about their creepy partner.

So, Iran had zero goodwill anywhere. Thus, once it started bleeding, no patron appeared to help it in extremis. Even its partners may have been not unhappy that this loud bully received a comeuppance and may now be silently glad the U.S. ended its nuclear threat.

In realist terms, a hubristic, smug Iran winked and nodded that it had a hand on October 7. No one believed its later, scared, and phony disavowals. Militarily speaking, if it was ultimately behind the horror of October 7, it should have realized that Israel was not going to allow another Holocaust.

On October 8, 2023, Tehran had a choice to publicly abhor the killing and communicate to Israel its innocence or go for broke and help to coordinate massive and simultaneous missile strikes from the Houthis, Hezbollah, and Iran in an all-out war.

Instead, each of these terrorist entities acted piecemeal, and Iran sat back and watched, hoping one might find success. Or worse, each was relieved when Israel attacked elsewhere one of their supposed allies.

Israel systematically checked off each terrorist entity, for the most part in a compartmentalized and separate fashion, before turning to Iran.

By that time, its surrogates were either defanged or harbored ill will that Tehran had led them on, but was nowhere to be found when they were held to account and crushed by Israel.